

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RUDIUS A. BROWN,

Defendant.

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Case No. 1:14-cr-00214-20

OPINION & ORDER  
[Resolving Doc. [1330](#)]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Rudius Brown moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).<sup>1</sup>

In response, the Government asked the Court to hold Brown's motion in abeyance until the Sixth Circuit releases its opinion in *United States v. McCall*.<sup>2</sup> Because *McCall* will guide the Court's analysis here, the Court **GRANTS** the Government's motion.

Brown pleaded guilty to one controlled-substance conspiracy charge.<sup>3</sup> The Court sentenced him to 132 months' incarceration and entered judgment on March 19, 2015.<sup>4</sup>

This is Brown's second compassionate-release motion. In his first such motion, Brown argued in part that the Court miscounted his prior offenses when determining whether he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1. The Court denied that motion on February 8, 2022.<sup>5</sup>

Brown now renews his argument that he would not qualify as a career offender if sentenced today, but provides a different reason. Specifically, he argues that even if his

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<sup>1</sup> Doc. [1326](#).

<sup>2</sup> [20 F.4th 1108 \(6th Cir. 2021\)](#).

<sup>3</sup> Doc. [911](#) at 3, 8 (PageID 5736, 5741).

<sup>4</sup> Doc. [678](#) at 1–2 (PageID 4245–46).

<sup>5</sup> Doc. [1308](#).

Case No. 14-cr-214-20  
Gwin, J.

predicate offenses fall within §4B1.1(a)(3)’s parameters, §4B1.1(a)(2)’s “controlled substance offense” definition doesn’t encompass his instant conspiracy conviction. He relies on the Sixth Circuit’s opinions in *United States v. Havis*<sup>6</sup> and *United States v. Stephens*.<sup>7</sup> Together, those cases instruct that inchoate crimes like attempt or conspiracy are not “controlled substance offense[s]” under §4B1.1(a)(2).<sup>8</sup> So, based on the circuit’s reinterpretation of §4B1.1, Brown would not qualify for the career-offender enhancement if sentenced today.

Brown argues that *Havis*’s nonretroactive sentencing-law change creates an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence.<sup>9</sup>

In *United States v. McCall*, a Sixth Circuit panel decided that courts should consider nonretroactive sentencing-law changes “in combination” with other factors when deciding whether to grant relief.<sup>10</sup> But in April, the Sixth Circuit vacated that decision and set the case for rehearing *en banc*.<sup>11</sup> The *en banc* court heard oral argument on June 8, 2022.

The Government moves to hold Brown’s motion in abeyance until after the Sixth Circuit issues its decision in *McCall*. The Government argues that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling will clarify conflicting panel decisions about how nonretroactive sentencing-law changes affect compassionate-release motions.

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<sup>6</sup> 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019).

<sup>7</sup> 812 F. App’x 356 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem.).

<sup>8</sup> *Havis*, 927 F.3d at 386–87; *Stephens*, 812 F. App’x at 357.

<sup>9</sup> The Government’s motion mischaracterizes the career-offender sentencing-law change as originating in the 2018 First Step Act rather than *Havis*. Doc. 1330 at 1 (PageID 8366). This is wrong, but it doesn’t change the Court’s analysis. The Sixth Circuit treats nonretroactive statutory sentencing-law changes and judicial sentencing-law changes the same. See *United States v. McKinnie*, 24 F.4th 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing *United States v. Hunter*, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021)) (*Havis* errors, like other judicial sentencing-law changes, don’t apply retroactively).

<sup>10</sup> 20 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2021). But see *McKinnie*, 24 F.4th at 583. There, a panel explained that “because *Havis* does not apply retroactively, a *Havis* error is not an extraordinary and compelling reason to modify an inmate’s sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” *Id.* at 587–88. According to *McKinnie*, that’s true whether a compassionate-release movant argues that a *Havis* error alone or combined with other factors presents an extraordinary and compelling reason to release him. *Id.* at 588–90.

<sup>11</sup> *United States v. McCall*, 29 F.4th 816 (6th Cir. 2022) (mem.).

Case No. 14-cr-214-20  
Gwin, J.

The Court agrees and therefore **GRANTS** the Government's motion to hold Brown's compassionate-release motion in abeyance until after the Sixth Circuit issues its *en banc* decision in *United States v. McCall*. The Court directs the parties to advise the Court of any Sixth Circuit *McCall* decision within five days of the filing of any Sixth Circuit opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: September 13, 2022

s/ James S. Gwin  
JAMES S. GWIN  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE